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Brazil’s large-scale privatisation programme in the 1990s presents the image ofan economy in transition from state domination to one in which marketforces prevail. The aim of this article is to show that such a characterisation
of events masks a far more nuanced and complex picture in which the withering
away of the state has been more apparent than real. Moreover, with the election of
President Lula da Silva in October 2002, a profound shift in policy has occurred
which beckons a resurgence of intervention and a recasting of the regulatory role of
the state. To advance our argument, we shall mainly focus on the experience of the
public utilities sector, in particular charting its experiences following privatisation.
To begin with, however, we set matters in a broader context briefly reviewing
the evolution of state participation in the economy in the period stretching from the
1930s to the late 1970s, stressing its influence in shaping the industrialisation
process. In addition, we shall review the transformation of state enterprises from
being a mainly positive influence on the Brazilian economy to becoming increasing
dysfunctional.This will be followed by a brief overview of the extent of the privati-
sation process of the 1990s, and the resulting change of the role of the state in the
country’s economy, that is, from being a direct participant to being mainly a regula-
tory agent. Our particular concern in this regard will be to offer a preliminary
assessment of the success of the state’s new “regulatory approach” focusing on the
experiences of the electricity and telecommunications sectors.The paper concludes
by examining the likely development of utilities regulation now that President Lula
da Silva’s government is in place.
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THE PARTICIPANT STATE: 1930-1980
Beginning in the 1930s and accelerating in the post World War II period the state
enterprise sector became dominant in public utilities, heavy industry, the exploita-
tion of natural resources and the financial sector. It was complementary to the pri-
vate domestic and multinational, sectors, that is, each ownership sector specialised
in specific sectors in the economy where it had the greatest comparative advantage.
By the 1970s a large proportion of the steel industry (approximately 70% of capac-
ity) was in the hands of state enterprises. Similarly state enterprises were heavily
involved in the exploitation of natural resources, as was the case with Petrobras
(Petroleum and various derivative industries) and Vale do Rio Doce (mineral
exploitation)3. In addition to these areas, public sector ownership was widespread
in the field of public utilities, railroad transportation, ports and the banking and
financial sector (which includes the gigantic development bank – BNDES, and com-
mercial banks owned either by the federal or state governments).
The importance of the state can also be gauged by the following facts: a) a 1974
survey of the 5113 largest incorporated firms showed that over 39% of assets
belonged to SOEs, while these same firms were responsible for 16% of the value of
sales; b) a 1985 survey of the 8094 largest firms revealed that the share of net assets
of state enterprises amounted to 48%, while the share of these enterprises in total
sales totalled 28.1%.4 The state also had an extremely powerful position in the
financial sector.
The loans of the BNDES, together with other federal and state development
banks, and official savings banks amounted to about 50% of gross capital formation
in 1980s.The state also had a considerable influence in the commercial banking sec-
tor. For instance in 1985 the Banco do Brasil (the federally owned commercial bank)
held 24% of all funds on deposit in Brazil’s 50 largest commercial banks including
some commercial banks owned by the state governments. Finally, at the beginning
of the 1980s, the national development bank, the national housing bank (now
extinct), the Bank of the Northeast and various development banks of individual
states, provided more than 70% of the loans devoted to investment purposes.What
was the impact of this substantial presence of the state in the Brazilian economy and
was it necessarily harmful to the interests of the private sector?
It has been argued that for a long period of time this large-scale presence of
the state in the economy was beneficial to both the domestic and foreign-owned
private sectors.5 State firms provided relatively cheap inputs to the private sector
(steel, electric power etc.).The state was also the major source of finance for both
public and private investment activities. In fact, there was a remarkable growth of
savings in the 1960s and 70s which was due to the government sector. The latter
created and administered many forced saving funds through various social securi-
ty levies. For instance, in 1974 64% of Brazil’s savings were due to publicly
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administered social security funds; by 1980 this had risen to over 70%. All these
factors went some way to contributing to the accelerated growth which Brazil
enjoyed between 1950 and 1980. However beneficial the impacts regarding
growth, the hefty presence of the state failed to address the worsening pattern of
income distribution.6
THE DECADENCE OF STATE ENTERPRISES
Already, by the late 1970s a number of weaknesses inherent in the extensive pres-
ence of state enterprises had become apparent.The main features of the decadence
of state enterprises were the following: a) the use of state enterprises as macro-
economic policy instruments, for instance forcing state enterprises to restrain
their prices and tariffs they charged for their products in order to repress infla-
tionary pressures. This did not halt inflation but caused large deficits in the affect-
ed enterprises, undermining their efficient operations and forcing the state to sub-
sidise the losses incurred, which in turn, worsened the government deficit; b) the
political pressure to over-employ in SOEs and to increasing hire individuals with
personal connections to executive positions; c) the increasing number of cases of
corruption resulting from the quasimonopoly position of state firms in certain sec-
tors; d) the use of public enterprises to borrow more on the international market
than they needed in order to provide the inflow of foreign exchange in order to
cope with a deteriorating balance of payments. This placed many SOEs in a pre-
carious financial position.7
THE PRIVATISATION DRIVE OF THE 1990s
In the 1980s the combination of the debt crisis, the fiscal crisis and bouts of hyper-
inflation forced Brazil to adopt a set of neo-liberal policies, one of whose main fea-
tures was privatisation. The pressure to adopt privatisation policies came not only
from within, but also from the demands of Brazil’s major external creditors, most
especially the multilateral organisations, the IMF and the World Bank.8
THE PRIVATISATION EXPERIENCE
Starting timidly in the late 1980s but accelerating markedly after 1994, Brazil
engaged in one of the world’s largest privatisation programmes. At first privatisa-
tion was concentrated in the steel and petrochemicals sectors, later embracing such
state firms as the airplane manufacturer Embraer. From 1994 on the privatisation
programme expanded rapidly, as it now included public utilities, such as telecom-
munications, electricity distribution, railroads, ports and some of the major high-
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ways. At first foreign participation was limited. After a number of constitutional
amendments which allowed foreign firms to participate in public utilities, the
involvement of foreign capital in the privatisation process increased dramatically.
By 2002, receipts for privatisation amounted to US$ 105.3bn. Of this, foreign par-
ticipation totalled US$ 42.1bn and on a sectoral basis privatisation of public utili-
ties amounted to 63%.9
It is important to note that a substantial source of domestic participation in the
privatisation auctions was constituted by the public sector using the resources of
forced savings schemes. In this regard, the role of public sector pension schemes
should be highlighted. For instance, in the case of the steel industry – among the
earliest privatisations – the Banco do Brasil pension fund, Previ, was a key player.
By 1997 it had acquired a substantial (23.9%) stake in Acesita (a special steels com-
pany) which, in turn, owned important stakes in two other steel enterprises,
Indústrias Villares and Aços Villares (De Paula, 1998). Within the same industry, a
consortium of other public sector pension funds had managed to acquire a sub-
stantial stake in Belgo Mineira, a key enterprise in the speciality steels market. Of
course, the role of the public sector pension funds in the privatisation process
extended to well beyond the steel sector. In the case of Previ10, it can be shown
that by the end of 2002, the fund had acquired major stakes across a range of key
privatised companies.11
THE ROLE OF THE STATE AS A REGULATOR
One notable feature of Brazil’s privatisation has been the fact that public utility pri-
vatisation has been carried out through the granting of concessions rather than a per-
manent transfer of assets. The winner of the concession contract would be running
a facility for a limited period of time (usually 20-25 years) at the end of which the
assets would revert to the state unless a new concession would be granted either to
the old firm or a newcomer after an appropriate auction. During the concession
period, the concession contract would be in force. It would include provisions for
rate or tariff readjustments, investment obligations for both maintenance and
upgrading the relevant facilities etc. For instance in the telecommunications sector,
strict targets have been set for increasing provision of fixed and cellular lines, while
service quality is also monitored and enforced.12
The administration of the concession contract would be in the hands of special
regulatory institutions (e.g. ANATEL; ANEEL) and in some cases government min-
istries. As one commentator noted the introduction of these agencies established “an
array of sectoral regulatory-normative federal agencies that…have changed not only
the procedures but indeed the culture of Brazilian public sector management pri-
marily in the area of infrastructure. Previously line ministries or public enterprises
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under their jurisdiction have carried out not only policy-making functions but also
economic alterations…”13
An additional aspect of privatisation through concessions was that the BNDES
development bank helped to finance both domestic and foreign bidders in the auc-
tion process.
THE REGULATORY STATE AND ITS ECONOMIC INFLUENCE
Since public utilities privatisation through the concessions model had the heaviest
weight in the privatisation process, regulation has become one of the most impor-
tant channels through which the state can influence economic activity.14 Of the
state’s various regulatory responsibilities one of the most significant concerns the
setting of tariffs. In formulating policy in this regard the state has had to balance the
influence of competing constituencies. In the period of rapid privatisation, the state
in an effort to attract bidders to its concession auctions prioritised the interests of
investors, raising tariffs sharply in order to raise the rate of return and thus attract
the maximum number of bidders.15
As a result of the regulator’s lenient policies towards the new concessionaires,
profitability of public utilities increased dramatically. For instance, in the case of
electricity generation, from being negative average profitability rose to 1.8% as a
percentage of turnover in 1996 to 4.3% in 1999.16 For the electricity distribution
sector, too, the initial years post-privatisation proved a favourable period: between
1995 and 1999 average profitability increased from 4.3% to 5.9%, having been neg-
ative for much of the first half of the decade.
An important consequence of privatisation was that the concessionaires were
required to substantially upgrade the facilities they administered under the concession
contract.This was often made easier by the government through generous loans made
to the concessionaires via the BNDES. In the case of the electricity sector, between
1995 and 2000 no less than 43.8% of total investments carried out by the newly pri-
vatised utility enterprises was financed using funds from the BNDES. Such funding
resulted in a surge in fixed capital formation: between 1994 and 1999 installed capac-
ity in the generating sector leapt from 54.1 GW to 64.0GW.17 The railroad trans-
portation system has also been realising a quantum leap in investment following its
privatisation through the launch of concessions. Once again the BNDES is proving a
key player in financing rises in fixed capital formation: between 2000 and 2004 the
Bank has committed itself to funding 47% of the projected rise in network capacity.18
In the case of the 9945 km of privatised federal and state highways the BNDES
has also proven an active participant in the financing of infrastructural improve-
ments. Since the launch of the concessions, the Bank has provided funding amount-
ing to 31% of total investments in highway upgrading.
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POLITICAL CHANGE AND ITS REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
By 2002 the harmonious relationship between the government and the conces-
sionaires began to unwind. There have been a number of reasons for this. For
instance, the high interest rate policies adopted in order to defend the exchange
rate contributed to low economic growth and to an increase in the burden of debt
incurred by the concessionaires.This was reinforced by the devaluation of the Real
in January 1999 and the continued depreciation of the currency throughout up to
the final quarter of 2002. The resulting rise in the cost of the debt of many con-
cessionaires made them demand generous increases in their tariffs.
However, as early as 1998 the attitude of the government was already becom-
ing less favourable to the concessionaires and more sympathetic to the needs of the
lowincome population and to other hard-pressed users of public utilities. For
example, in the case of highway concessions, the protests of associations of truck
drivers in various states forced the government to reduce tolls.19 These reduc-
tions, in turn were contested by a number of concessionaires, who went to court
claiming that by reducing tolls the government had violated the concession con-
tracts.20 This demonstrates an early example of the pressures from different
groups to which regulators were subject. In the case of the telecommunications
sector, the election of the Lula administration appears to herald similar downward
pressure on tariffs. At present (2003) telecommunications enterprises are seeking
to maintain in place arrangements by which tariffs are adjusted in line with gen-
eral price inflation. However, according to the Minister for Communications,
Miro Teixeira, this regulatory approach is unlikely to survive for long with the
“elimination of rate indexation and the promotion of increased competition.”21
In 2003, downward pressures on tariffs had resulted in a potential change of
the ownership landscape as there were signs that some concessionaires were seri-
ously thinking of abandoning their concession contracts, resulting in a process 
of renationalisation.
Another key regulatory issue faced by the concessionaires in the wake of pri-
vatisation has had less to do with the level of tariffs per se than with uncertainty
over their future path and the transparency which attaches to their setting and
enforcement. In this regard, the performance of some of the regulatory agencies
has been more investor-friendly than others. In the case of the electrical energy
sector, for example, the regulator, ANEEL, has come under consistent criticism
for the opacity, complexity and inconsistency of its management of tariff setting.
For Landau (2002, p.5) ANEEL comes in for criticism “for its failure to adopt
clear, unequivocal and rational rules on tarification. This factor has contributed
significantly to insufficient private investment in power generation (because
investors did not know the relative prices of inputs and outputs of generation
plant, leading to shortages..).”
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ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF REGULATION: THE CONTRASTING
FORTUNES OF ELECTRICITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Of course, it should be recognised that the post privatisation period in Brazil has
been associated with regulatory achievements as well as failures.The case of telecom-
munications offers a sharp contrast with that of electrical energy.The telecommuni-
cations regulator, ANATEL, has succeeded in presiding over a surge in both capacity
and in competition whether in the fields of fixed line or mobile services.22 However,
the experience of the electrical energy sector has proven far less favourable, a con-
clusion underlined by the power shortages and outages that plagued Brazil in 2001-
2.What factors can help account for this apparent contrast in fortunes?
In first place, it is important to recognise the fundamentally different techno-
logical drivers affecting Brazilian electrical and telecommunications utilities.
Although both classic “network industries”, the telecommunications sector has in
the past 10 years witnessed a far more rapidly moving technological frontier than
electricity. One consequence of this is that the unit cost of furnishing capacity in
telecommunications has rapidly fallen as technologies such as fibre-optic transmis-
sion and digital exchanges have been diffused. At the same time, the introduction of
cellular telecommunications technology (in particular high-capacity digital net-
works) has greatly enhanced the capability of utilities to provide voice and data serv-
ices to consumers and, for the first time, to offer a real alternative to fixed line net-
works. The effects of these fundamental technological facts (which are all too often
ignored in the regulatory debate in Brazil) have been, above and beyond the ability
to deliver rapidly increased capacity, to challenge the very nature of telecommuni-
cations as a classic natural monopoly.
In the case of electricity, by contrast, the pace of technological change has
been far more restricted while Brazil has remained overwhelmingly reliant on
hydro-electric power.Whatever regulatory regime might have been applied would
have had to face this reality and to recognise the relative supply inelasticity inher-
ent in it. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that difficulties of the electricity sector –
in particular the arrival of the power supply crisis – could have been avoided had
additional (especially thermal and long-distance transmission)23 capacity been
available. The fact that events unfolded differently, and that sector performance
was so much poorer than telecommunications, must therefore be viewed in part
as a regulatory artefact.
There are a number of reasons that help explain why this was the case. First, as
Goldstein & Pires (2001) point out, there is the question of timing. Unlike its coun-
terpart in telecommunications, the electricity regulator, ANEEL, was not estab-
lished at the outset of privatisation, rather coming into being once the process was
underway. According to Goldstein & Pires (2001, p.21) this led to its “legitimacy in
dispute settlement and arbitration (being) contested”. According to Salgado (2003)
ESP1_p267_282.qxd  11/3/05  21:49  Page 7
Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, p. 267-281, 2005. Edição especial 1. 
FROM THE DEVELOPMENTAL TO THE REGULATORY STATE:: EDMUND AMANN AND WERNER BAER274
these problems were compounded by the continuing co-existence of public sector
enterprises (such as Chesf and Furnas) with private sector ones, a situation quite
unlike that in telecommunications. The lingering role of the state as owner as well
as its newly established one as regulator not unsurprisingly led to conflicts of inter-
est.The sense that there were privileged players within the generating sector is one
of a number of factors which help to explain why private sector investment in it has
proven so restricted. More generally, Salgado (2003) notes that an inconsistency of
important contractual rules, especially between generators and distributors across
the sector, has made ANEEL’s task very complex and has certainly retarded efforts
to stimulate the entry of new investors.
Aside from uncertainty and complexity regarding the regulatory framework in
electricity, it is also worth noting that, in at least partial contrast to telecommuni-
cations, the problem is one of regulatory governance and institutional development
itself. As Goldstein and Pires (2001, p.21) put it: “as most of ANEEL’s top man-
agement is formed by former DNAEE24 officials, the signal given to private
investors is that the crux of the regulatory game still concerns technical, legal and
operational issues, and not the creation of the economic incentives necessary to
create a really competitive market”. In addition, it should be pointed out that one
key aspect of ANEEL’s external institutional relations, that with the oil and water
regulators (ANP and ANA), has not been coordinated in an efficient or effective
manner.Thus, critical issues for the electricity generating sector such as the devel-
opment of water and gas resources have not been addressed in an inter-depart-
mentally “joined-up” or integrated fashion.
THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT LULA DA SILVA, PUBLIC UTILITIES
AND THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATORY STATE
From the foregoing, the appropriate conclusion would seem for the electricity reg-
ulator, to emulate in some sense the experience of the telecommunications sector25,
and to develop investor-friendly regulatory regimes which have as their core a focus
on transparency, predictability and, above all, a commitment to setting tariffs
designed to stimulate growth in capacity.26
While this appears valid within a permanently privatised public utilities setting,
it implies that the socio-political preferences of society will not change and that,
therefore, it is possible for the regulatory agencies to be permanently inclined
towards favouring the private investor. We have, however shown in this article that
in a democratic regime there may be substantial swings in the mood and preferences
of society. If, for any reason, this mood swings in the direction of more populist poli-
cies, that is, placing equity above the need to entice investors, the possibility of more
lasting guarantees facing investors will not be possible.
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With the election of President Lula da Silva in October 2002 the regulatory
agencies established under President Cardoso have come under acute pressure.
According to a recent article in the Washington Times, President da Silva is seeking to
curb the regulators’ powers after having accused these agencies of having overseen
excessively investor-friendly pricing regimes. In particular, President da Silva was
quoted as stating that “(the regulators) are procuring the political power of Brazil.
They’ve created a wall between themselves and the government.”The article further
states that the new president and his team have been studying the country’s regula-
tors, targeting them for changes which are said to benefit certain sectors more than
the population in general. Among the issues of contention between the government
and the regulators is the linkage of price rises for intermediate inputs such as steel
and ethanol to movements in the US Dollar. The article further states that the new
government has put the brakes on recent attempts to increase energy rates by more
than 40% over the next four years.
Finally, a Senator Aloizio Mercadante, a confidant of the president, and the gov-
ernment’s leader in the Senate said that “there are serious problems with the agen-
cies, from the area of tariffs to that of regulation.The government has lost the abil-
ity to regulate important sectors such as utilities.” Another politician close to the
president, Congressman Roberto Jefferson stated that “we are certain that the reg-
ulators (are acting) above the law.” “They’re treated like a parallel power. I think the
performance of these agencies is really an abuse.”27
Changes in the political atmosphere alluded to above could also manifest them-
selves in the government’s policy regarding the appointment of key personnel to the
regulatory agencies.28 Landau (2002, p.8-9) has observed that up to the end of the
Cardoso administration the government gave preference in its nominations to
“expertise over partisan allegiance or the exchange of political favours, but the
vagaries of politics in the future may intrude on this very sensitive process.The out-
standing example of an agency governed by personalities of acknowledged stature is
ANATEL, whose resolutions tends to be politically neutral whereas ANEEL, where
nominations are made on the basis of political rather than technical criteria, has
often produced resolutions that result in controversy, to say the least, and that are
disputed (often in court) by both concession-holders and consumer groups.”
Another perceptive observation relating to the inevitably political nature of the
regulatory mission emerges from a recent international report.29 The report draws
attention to the fact that “it is one thing for countries to make a policy decision to
create an independent regulatory agency, and quite another to empower the agency
to act independently and effectively… Inevitably (regulatory agencies) are the prod-
ucts of political, social and legal conditions that exist at fixed points in time, in each
country… regulatory approaches and policies change, and agencies change with
them” (International Telecommunications Union, 2001 p.1).
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Some might even doubt that investor-friendly regulatory policies will attract a
substantial amount of private investment. As we have indicated, a large proportion
of the financing of public utilities in Brazil was supplied by the BNDES using public
money. Were the financially parlous state of the utilities sector to result in its pro-
gressive re-nationalisation then, in the absence of investor friendly regulatory poli-
cies, much needed increases in investment could only be implemented through
either direct subsidies of consumers or through direct public sector capital invest-
ment. In other words, it is ironic that whether the administration of public utilities
remains within the private sector or reverts to direct government control, then in
either case the resources of the state will always be required to sustain investment
programmes. Of course, one might take the view that, whatever the role of the state
in providing capital, these resources might be used more efficiently used by private-
ly administered entities.
At the beginning of the 21st Century it would seem that the major influence of
the state on economic activities is through its regulatory agencies and through the
development bank.Through regulation it influences the country’s electric power sup-
ply, its telecommunications system, its rail and road transportation network, its oil
exploration and production sector (both through the still publicly owned Petrobras
and the regulation of the activities of foreign oil prospectors). In addition, the state
development bank is still the major source of investment funds.Through these instru-
ments – both as a regulator and as financier – the state continues to exercise a major
influence over the development of these sectors. More specifically, given the exis-
tence of thin capital markets – which necessitate borrowing at subsidised interest
rates – and regulated prices, two of the most important dimensions of the economic
environment faced by “privatised” enterprises are set by the state.
Above and beyond any regulatory or financing role, it should be remembered
that the state has not entirely relinquished its position as the channel through which
savings are accumulated (forced savings through pension funds) and then directed at
favoured sectors. We have shown among the most favoured sectors have been the
privatised utilities and such industries as steel.
With a depressed domestic market, and the financially parlous state of many
multinational utilities groups (especially in telecommunications) many enterprises
in the Brazilian utilities sector have been experiencing liquidity problems which the
state is increasingly less willing to address through favourable tariff adjustments.
This may lead many of the concessionaires to abandon their contracts, in essence
leading to a “re nationalisation” of the utility.
An interesting example of the difficult current (2003) state of the utilities sector is
provided by the case of Eletropaulo, the São Paulo electricity distributor whose con-
cession was obtained by the US group AES in 1998. AES has run into difficulties with
its Brazilian subsidiary as tariffs and consequently revenues have failed to rise in line
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with the enterprise’s debt payment obligations to its creditors, most especially the
BNDES. Owing the BNDES US$ 1.13bn of which US$ 600 million is past due,AES has
found itself – temporarily at least – unable to continue with its repayments, triggering
heated negotiations between itself and the Bank. The regulatory and financial conflict
between AES and organs of the Brazilian state has now become something of a test case
regarding public policy response to the deteriorating condition of the utilities sector.
Mindful of the implications for other foreign investors, the US State Department has
become involved with the US Ambassador to Brazil attempting to intercede.30
AES/Eletropaulo is not the only example of a foreign-owned utility in financial dif-
ficulties. In the case of the French-owned EDF, its Rio de Janeiro electricity distribu-
tor, LIGHT, owes more than US$ 125 million to a consortium of domestic and foreign
banks.31 In addition, the Minas Gerais – based distributor SEB/CEMIG (also partial-
ly-owned by AES) is overdue on some US$ 87 million debt payment to the BNDES.
While in many regards, the liberalisation of the Brazilian telecommunications
sector has proved more successful than in the case of electricity, the sector may nev-
ertheless face serious problems. In particular, some enterprises will struggle to
extract themselves from the trap of heavy indebtedness and lack of liquidity. These
problems initially surfaced following the depreciation of the Real in early 1999. Since
then, a number of service providers have been struggling to meet their debt obliga-
tions, faced with a mismatch between foreign currency denominated debts and local
currency denominated revenue streams.To make matters worse, revenues have been
constrained by a combination of price regulation and the failure of market demand to
expand to the extent originally anticipated. In the most recent casualty of these
unfavourable conditions, the São Paulo cellular service operator BCP was taken over
by its creditors in April 2003, forcing the exit of a major US shareholder, Bell South.
In order to prevent future recurrences of such cases, the authorities would need
to ensure that tariff alterations appropriately reflected the evolving cost base of
telecommunications enterprises. On this score, the outlook for the sector is not
especially favourable. In June 2003, hot on the heels of criticism from President da
Silva himself, a series of legal injunctions overturned Anatel-agreed tariff increases
nationwide.32 More troublingly still for Anatel, a draft presidential decree released
in May 2003 mandated the handing back of much responsibility for the oversight of
the telecommunications sector from the regulatory agency to the Ministry for
Communications. In particular, the decree requires that Anatel be stripped of its
decision-making functions in terms of tariff setting and the establishment of service
obligation rules. So long as uncertainty continues to surround the regulation of the
telecommunications sector, it is difficult to envisage a renewed wave of investment
of the type experienced in the 1990s.
Perhaps the firmest statement to date of the Lula government’s intent regarding
the regulation of public utilities came at the end of 2003 with the announcement of
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a Presidential decree establishing a New Model for the electricity sector (IPEA,
2003).The measures contained in the decree reflect two key policy precepts that have
emerged in the government’s other pronouncements on public utilities; that regula-
tion should be increasingly “repatriated” to the ministries from the agencies and that
the thrust of policy should aim at delivering low tariffs over the longer term in order
to realise social objectives.
Pursuant to these guiding principles, the New Model mandates that future tenders
for generation projects be evaluated not on the basis of the most modest use of public
funds but on their ability to deliver the lowest tariffs (ibid. p.26). In addition, deci-
sions over the award of such tenders will be made by the Ministry of Mines and Energy
(MME) and not, as hitherto, by ANEEL.This represents a real stripping away of power
from the regulator and could presage yet further centralisation of regulatory functions
by the MME. The other key provision of the Model strengthens the sanctions against
distributors who experience difficulties in making payments to their suppliers. Since
the state remains a key player in the generation market while the private sector pre-
dominates to a much greater extent in the distribution sector, this represents a clear
manipulation of regulatory policy in the direct interest of the public sector.
The current direction of policy and the not unrelated sickly state of many pri-
vatelyowned utility providers clearly raises an important issue for the government: can
it any longer attract the bidding of new concessionaires, and in order to do this, would
it be obliged to offer more generous tariff conditions? If the re-nationalised enterpris-
es should remain in the hands of the public sector, would the state be in a position to
run a deficit-generating public utility? If the latter, the implication may be that there
would be a decline in the rate of return accruing to the investments of the “forced
savers” administered by the BNDES. In the past such a reduction in the rate of return
may have been feasible against the backdrop of a relatively young population.
Nowadays, however, with an ageing population relying increasingly on savings through
the social security system, there would be less scope for such financing arrangements.
Even in the non-public utility sectors which were privatised in the 1990s but
whose new owners were also heavily indebted to the development bank, what would
happen if due to difficult economic conditions, that is, lower growth and higher inter-
est rates, the owners of these firms defaulted? In this eventuality it appears probable
that their debt to the BNDES would have to be converted into ownership shares.
Thus, a form of re-nationalisation would occur.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have shown that Brazil’s economy in the aftermath of privatisation
has not become as fully exposed to market forces as one might have expected. All of
the important public utilities sectors are subject to substantial regulation and a large
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proportion of all productive sectors remain dependent on the state for investment
financing. We would not wish to pretend that the post privatisation period has wit-
nessed no meaningful alteration in the scope of state intervention in the productive
sector. In particular it should be emphasised that privatised enterprises now have
much greater control over their internal functioning, their cost base and, most
important of all the size and composition of their labour force which is no longer
subject to political interference.33
However, we have shown that a more populist stance in regulating public utili-
ties and the precariousness of the debtors of the development bank (due to interest
and exchange rate movements) may augur a period of progressive re-nationalisation
and, at the same time, could jeopardise the security of the forced savings of the pub-
lic. It is thus more than clear that the functioning of the Brazilian economy will not
be subject solely to market forces but will continue to be strongly influenced by the
actions of the state.
NOTES 
1 School of Economic Studies, University of Manchester
2 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
3 For details see Baer (2001) Ch. 12 and Amann, De Paula and Ferraz (2002) and also Baer (1969)
4 Baer (2001)
5 See Evans (1979), Amann (2000), Baer (2001)
6 Wells (1976) Werneck (1986)
7 Baer (2001, pp. 283-284)
8 Castelar Pinheiro (1999)
9 BNDES Privatização no Brasil (2003)
10 Previ had by the end of the 1990s acquired a 13.8% stake in CSN, Brazil’s largest and oldes steel company
(Amann, De Paula & Ferraz, 2002)
11 For instance, among Previ’s R$13.4bn in total equity holdings in December 2002 the following privatised
companies featured prominently: Acesita R$39M; Brasil Telecom R$143M; Eletropaulo R$22M; Embraer R$852M;
CVRD R$307M (Source: Previ Annual Report 2002)
12 BNDES (2000, p.9)
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13 Landau, Georges ‘The regulatory-normative framework in Brazil’, Policy Papers on the Americas, Vol. XIII, Study
2 April 2002 p.2 CSIS, Washington D.C.
14 For a comprehensive review of the rise of the regulatory state in alternative national contexts see Glaeser and
Shleifer (2003)
15 In the city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, while the consumer price index rose by 189.7% between August




19 In 1998 truck driver protests resulted in a 50% reduction in tolls; in 1999 tolls were reduced between 20 and
28% and in July 1999 there was a brief national truckers’ strike demanding a toll reduction.
20 BNDES Seminário de Privatização, November 2000
21 Brazil Focus David Fleischer, 24th February 2003
22 International Telecommunications Union (2001) Another comprehensive review of the accomplishments in
the telecommunications area can be found in a chapter by Siqueira in Lamounier & Figueiredo (eds.) 2002 pp. 215-
240. The same volume also contains a chapter on the accomplishments in the transport sector written by De Toledo
pp. 241-292
23 Much long distance high-voltage transmission capacity remains in the hands of the state. Efforts to boost private
investment in this sector have been particularly hampered by regulatory uncertainty and constant changes in stance by
ANEEL (Goldstein & Pires, 2001)
24 The government department responsible for sector regulation prior to privatisation.
25 We do not of course wish to pretend that the telecommunications sector has been without its problems: as
will be seen recent anaemic growth in revenues allied to foreign currency linked debt have taken their toll and are
prompting a process of corporate restructuring.
26 José Claudio Linhares Pires, Fabio Giambiagi and André Franco Sales, ‘As perspectives do setor eletrico após
o racionamento’, Revista do BNDES, 18, Dezembro de 2002 pp. 163-203
27 (Article by Bradley Brooks ‘Brazil may curb regulators’ powers’, The Washington Times February 20th 2003)
28 This is also emphasised in a general survey of Latin America’s electricity sector: see Fischer & Serra
(2000, pp.188-189), Spiller & Cardilli (1997) and Spiller & Viana-Martorell (1996)
29 International Telecommunications Union, Effective Regulation Case Study: Brazil, 2001
30 Estado de São Paulo, 12th and 13th March 2003; Jornal do Brasil, 12th March 2003
31VALOR, 2 Julho de 2003, p. B 1.
32 A 41.7% readjustment of rates which had been authorised by Anatel was suspended by the Court of Justice of
Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Brasil, June 30th 2003 p. A7.
33 In the case of the railroad sector, for example, employment since privatisation has declined substantially.
Employment in that part of the railroad network formerly controlled by the RFFSA has fallen from 28,639 in 1996 to
12,807 in 2000 (Ministério de Transportes, 2000).
ESP1_p267_282.qxd  11/3/05  21:50  Page 14
Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, p. 267-281, 2005. Edição especial 1. 
281:ESPECIAL 1 |  P. 267 - 282  | 20051
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AMANN, E (2000) Economic Liberalisation and Industrial Performance in Brazil, Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press
AMANN, E, De Paula, G. & Ferraz, J. (2002) ‘Ownership structures in the postprivatised Brazilian steel indus-
try: complexity, instability and the lingering role of the state’ mimeo University of Manchester
BAER, W (1969) The Development of the Brazilian Steel Industry, Nashville Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press
BAER, W (2001) The Brazilian Economy, Growth and Development, 5th edition, Westport Connecticut: Praeger
BNDES (2000) Telecommunicações: Cenário Pós-Privatização no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES
BNDES (2000b) O Setor Elétrico Pós-Privatização no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES
BNDES (2000c) As Concessões Ferroviárias, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES
BNDES (2003) Privatizações no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES
BROOKS, Bradley (2003) ‘Brazil may curb regulators’ powers’, Washington Times, February 20th
CASTELAR PINHEIRO (1999) ‘Privatização no Brasil: Por quê? Até onde? Até quando?’ in F. Giambiagi & M.
Mesquita Moreira (eds.) A Economia Brasileira nos Anos 90, Rio de Janeiro: BNDES
Estado de São Paulo (2003) March 12th and 13th
EVANS, P (1979) Dependent Development:The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil, Princeton
NJ: Princeton University Press
FISCHER, R. & Serra, P (2000) ‘Regulating the electricity sector in Latin America’, Economia, Vol. 1, No.1, Fall
pp.155-198
FLEISCHER, D (2003) Brazil Focus, February 24th
GLAESER, E.L.& Shleifer, A (2003) ‘The rise of the regulatory state,’ Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI
No.2, June pp.401-425
GOLDSTEIN, A. & Pires, J.C.P (2001) Brazilian Regulatory Agencies: Early Appraisal and Looming Challenges, mimeo
International Telecommunications Union (2001) Effective Regulation – Case Study: Brazil, Geneva: International
Telecommunications Union
24 IPEA (2003) Boletim de Politica Industrial, Dezembro
Jornal do Brasil (2003) March 12th
LAMOUNIER, B & Figueiredo, R (eds.) (2002) A Era FHC: Um Balanço, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados
LANDAU, G.D. (2002) ‘The regulatory-normative framework in Brazil’, Policy Papers on the Americas, Vol. XIII
April, Study 2, Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies
LINHARES PIRES, J.C., F. Giambiagi & A. F. Sales (2002) ‘As perspectivas do setor eletrico após o raciona-
mento’, Revista do BNDES, 18, Dezembro, pp. 163-203
Ministério de Transportes (2000) Relatórios Trimestrais de Acompanhamento de Concessões, Brasília: Ministério de
Transportes
SALGADO, L.H (2003) ‘Agências regulatórias na experiência Brasileira: um panorama do atual desenho institu-
cional’ IPEA Texto para discussão, No. 941
SPILLER, P. & Viana-Martorell, L. (1996) ‘How should it be done? Electricity regulation in Argentina, Brazil,
Uruguay and Chile’, in R.G Gilbert and E.P. Kahn (eds.) International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.82-125
SPILLER, P. & Cardilli, C. G. (1997) ‘The frontier of telecommunications de-regulation: small countries leading
the pack’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (4), pp. 127-138
WELLS, J (1976) ‘Underconsumption, market size and expenditure patterns in Brazil’, Bulletin of the Society for
Latin American Studies, No. 24 March
WERNECK, R. F (1986) ‘Poupança estatal, divida externa e crise financeira do setor público’, Pesquisa e
Planejamento Econômico, 16, No. 3 (Dezembro)
Edmund Amann
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER, UK
Werner Baer
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
ESP1_p267_282.qxd  11/3/05  21:50  Page 15
Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, p. 267-281, 2005. Edição especial 1. 
ESP1_p267_282.qxd  11/3/05  21:50  Page 16
Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, p. 267-281, 2005. Edição especial 1. 
